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Appellant Jennifer Harvey ("Harvey") respecthlly submits the following brief in 
reply to the response brief filed by Respondents, Robert and Alexis Read (the "Reads"). 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Harvey has filed a Motion to Strike and supporting memorandum 
contemporaneously with this Reply Brief, requesting that the Court strike andlor wholly 
disregard those portions of the Respondents' Brief which are devoted chiefly to vituperation and 
the general disparagement of Harvey, her legal counsel, and the Court. Harvey also requests the 
Court to strike Respondents' request that this Court reconsider its prior 2005 appellate decision 
in which it reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment. See Appendix A to Appellant's 
Reply Brief. In the interests of economy, Harvey will not reiterate her arguments in suppoa of 
her Motion to Strike, but incorporates that Motion and its supporting Memorandum herein by 
reference. 
Despite the difficulty of replying to a legal brief containing more personal insult 
than legal argument, it is Harvey's intention in submitting this Reply Brief to address the 
portions of Respondent's Brief that bear directly on the legal issues identified by Harvey in her 
opening brief and which are relevant to this Court's consideration of the issues on appeal. 
Harvey will simply disregard that content and choice of language in Respondents' Brief which is 
the subject of her Motion to Strike and rely on the Court's resolution of those matters separately 
and apart from the body of this appeal. 
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11. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Ruling That The Only 
Evidence Of The Intent Of The Parties To The 1972 BosslAndersen Deed 
Was Jerry VanOoyen 
In her opening brief, Harvey contended that the judgment of the lower court 
should be reversed because (1) the district court admittedly relied exclusively on the testimony of 
witness Jerry VanOoyen in determining the intent of the parties to the 1972 BossJAndersen deed; 
(2) the trial court's exclusive reliance on his testimony constitutes legal error; and (3) it was error 
for the trial court to rely on Mr. VanOoyen's testimony at all in light of the lack of that witness' 
competency to testify with regard to the intent of the parties to the 1972 deed in which he did not 
participate. 
1. The District Court Relied Exclusively On The Testimony Of Mr. 
VanOoyen To Determine The Intention Of The Parties To The 1972 
BosslAndersen Deed 
Respondents' Brief argues that Harvey's contention that the trial court relied 
exclusively on the testimony of Mr. VanOoyen "is a total misrepresentation of the record," 
because "the trial court clearly heard all of the evidence presented by both parties." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 16. Regardless of the fact that the trial court may have heard all of the 
evidence presented, that the trial court relied exclusively on the testimony of Mr. VanOoyen to 
establish the intent of the grantors was expressly and repeatedly admitted by the trial court as a 
matter of record. 
In its September 1,2006 Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, and 
Conclusions of Law ("Memorandum Decision"), the district court stated that: "The only 
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evidence regarding the intent of the parties to the original conveyance back in 1972, is the 
testimony of Jerry VanOoyen." R., Vol. 111, p. 546. Similarly, in its order awarding 
Respondents' their attorneys' fees, the trial court again stated that: "The only evidence of the 
grantors' intent was through the grantors' agent Jerry VanOoyen." R., Vol. IV, p. 787 (emphasis 
in original). However, as VanOoyen acknowledged at trial, he was not involved in the sale from 
the Andersens to Frank Boss (Harvey's predecessor in title). 
The district court erroneously disregarded the testimony of Mr. Boss, the only 
party to the 1972 AndersenlBoss deed who did testify at trial. This is made manifest by the 
following comments made by the court in its Memorandum Decision at the close of trial: 
VanOoyen's testimony was corroborated by Harvey's own 
witness, Frank Boss. In 1972, Boss bought the parcel Harvey now 
owns, plus some additional land which totalled 75 acres. Boss 
testified he sold the land in 1974, in part because he was tired of 
walking down to the creek to get his water. While living there in 
1972-1974, Boss dug a deep hole with a backhoe, adjacent to the 
creek, on what he considered his land and his side of the creek, 
from which to fetch his water to haul back to his cabin. Boss 
marked the location of the hole he dug on Exhibit QQQQQ. The 
mark on the map was adjacent to where Little Gold Creek 
currentlyflows,-in channel C. 
R., Vol. 111, p. 547 (emphasis added). Even the most cursory glance at trial Exhibit QQQQQ 
reveals that the trial court could not possibly have been relying on Mr. Boss' testimony to 
establish the location of the creek boundary in the location of Channel C, because the location of 
the watering hole Mr. Boss marked on that exhibit is most emphatically not "adjacent to where 
Little Gold Creek currently flows, in channel C;" but considerably north of the intersection of 
Channels C and D, adjacent only to ChannelD: 
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Def.'s Ex. QQQQQ (text boxes added). See, also, Appendix F to Appellant's Brief. 
The extent to which the district court went to willfully ignore Mr. Boss' testimony 
is further driven home when Exhibit QQQQQ is viewed in comparison with the following 
photograph taken by Harvey f?om her back porch in March 1999, showing the location of the 
intersection of Channels A and C relative to her back door, which is in the same location as the 
Boss cabin was in 1972: 
Def.'s Ex. LLL. If the Reads' theory is to be believed, the location and appearance of Channels 
A and C was the same in 1972 as it appears in this 1999 photograph. This means that, in 
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making his daily trek for water as depicted on Exhibit QQQQQ, Mr. Boss crossed over Channels 
A and C, in which "water was flowing in 1972," and which was literally but a stone's throw from 
his back door, and kept walking north until he reached the tree line at the base of the ridge where 
he had dug his watering hole. Tr., p. 655, L. 11 to p. 656, L. 9; and Pls.' Trial Exhibit 16. 
Such a theory simply defies reason. There is no way to reconcile Exhibit 
QQQQQ with Exhibit LLL except by the conclusion that the district court was entrenched in its 
erroneous legal conclusion that only Mr. VanOoyen's testimony was admissible to prove the 
intent of the parties in 1972. The district court's exclusive reliance on the testimony of Mr. 
VanOoyen, to the exclusion of any reasonable consideration of the testimony of Mr. Boss, 
constitutes a legal error warranting reversal of the entry ofjudgment in favor of the ~eads . '  
2. The District Court's Exclusive Reliance On The Testimony Of Mr. 
VanOoyen Constitutes An Error Of Law 
The Reads attempt to justify the district court's erroneous reliance on the 
testimony of Mr. VanOoyen by arguing that "what the grantors intended was paramount since 
' At page 19 of their brief, Respondents recite Mr. Boss' trial testimony as follows: 
"You know, I believed - when I bought the property I believed the 
centerline of the creek was my property line and that my property 
line was generally in this area [pointing to a map depicting the 
flow from the beaver ponds to Channel C and into Channel A] 
where it shows the creek." (Tr 652, L 16). 
The Court should note that the most critical portion of this so-called "testimony" is the bracketed 
portion added to the witness' actual testimony by Respondents. Nowhere in the record does Mr. 
Boss testify that the boundary line to the properties lay in the location of Channels A or C, and 
the documentary evidence generated by Mr. Boss at trial makes any inference of such fact 
unreasonable. 
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they created the subdivision and defined the common boundary between the parcels at issue to be 
the centerline of the creek. Mr. VanOoyen supplied the only evidence of what the grantors 
intended by that conveyance. . ." Respondents' Brief, pp. 17-18. However, Mr. VanOoyen 
admitted that he was not involved in that transaction. As a result, he was not competent to testify 
where the Andersens and Mr. Boss thought, or agreed, that the creek was located when they 
entered into their sale transaction. Mr. Boss was the only competent witness as to that fact, 
Idaho law clearly provides that the testimony of a buyer of real property is 
competent to "fix a boundary not otherwise clearly established by the deed." Paurley v. Havris, 
75 Idaho 112,268 P.2d 351 (1954); see, also, Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82,89,245 P.2d 
1052, 1057 (1952). The district court's decision to base its decision solely on the testimony of 
Mr. VanOoyen and its failure to consider the testimony of Mr. Boss in connection with the 
location of the 1972 creek boundary constitutes legal error and warrants reversal of the judgment 
entered in favor of the Reads. 
3. The District Court Erred In Relying On The Testimony Of Mr. 
VanOoyen Because Mr. VanOoyen Was Not Competent To Testify 
Regarding The Location Of The Creek In 1972 Or 1998 
The district court's reliance on the testimony of Mr. VanOoyen was also in error 
because Mr. VanOoyen was not competent to testify regarding the location of the creek 
boundary in 1972. It is undisputed that Mr. VanOoyen never walked the AndersenIBoss 
property line in connection with the sale of that property to Mr. Boss in 1972. It is also 
undisputed that the marketing diagram used by Mr. VanOoyen in connection with the sale of 
those parcels did not, and was never intended to, serve as a legal description of the location of 
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that boundary. The only person who testified at trial who had personal knowledge of the 
location of the creek boundary between the BossIAndersen parcels in 1972 (and was therefore 
competent to testify on that issue) was Mr. Boss. 
The Reads attempt to overcome this fatal flaw in their case in chief with the 
argument that "Harvey offered no evidence that the Andersens sold Mr. Boss anything other than 
what Mr. VanOoyen designed. The legal description to his deed refers to the centerline of the 
creek." Respondents' Brief, pp. 18-19. This argument completely sidesteps the dispositive fact 
at issue. There is no dispute regarding the description of the boundary as it appears in the Boss 
deed, nor why the boundary was called out in that manner. Nor is there any question that Mr. 
VanOoyen was competent to testify regarding the circumstances surrounding the general design 
of the subdivision. The issue at trial was where the Andersens and Mr. Boss either agreed or 
thought that the creek was located. 
Respondents' problem lies in the fact that merely establishing that the Aiidersens 
intended for the centerline of the creek to be used as the boundary to the BossIAndersen parcels 
does not in any way address where that creek actaaI&flowed at the time of the conveyance. It 
is this fact upon which Mr. VanOoyen was not competent to testify because, by his own 
admission, Mr. VanOoyen was never involved in any physical inspection of the property by 
either party at the time of that sale in 1972. 
In addition to his lack of personal knowledge regarding the precise location of the 
creek in 1972, Mr. VanOoyen's trial testimony that "the creek flows in the same location today 
as it did in 1972" is incompetent for the reason that the Reads failed to present an adequate 
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evidentiary foundation regarding the circumstances of Mr. VanOoyen's 1998 inspection of the 
Read property. The extent of this failure to lay an adequate evidentiary foundation for Mr. 
VanOoyen's trial testimony is outlined in detail at pages 31-33 of Appellant's opening brief. 
Other than calling these arguments "preposterous," the Reads offer no response in support of 
their failure to lay the necessary evidentiary foundation for Mr. VanOoyen's testimony at trial. 
Again, the trial court's exclusive reliance on Mr. VanOoyen's unfounded testimony regarding 
the location of the creek in 1972 and 1998 warrant reversal of the Reads' judgment. 
B. There Is No Substantial Or Credible Evidence Of Record To Support A 
Finding That Channel A Carried Water From Little Gold Creek Or That 
Channel C Even Existed In 1972 
1. The Reads Bore The Burden Of Proof To Show That The Parties To 
The BossIAndersen Deed Intended The Described Creek Boundary 
To Be In The Current Location Of Channels A and C 
In her opening brief, Harvey correctly set forth the legal proposition that: "It is 
well settled under Idaho case law that the party seeking to quiet title against another must 
succeed on the strength of his own title, and not on the weakness of that of his adversary." 
Owen v. Boydstun, 102 Idaho 3 1,624 P.2d 413 (198 1); Independence Placer Mining Co. v. 
Hellman, 62 Idaho 180, 109 P.2d 1038 (1941) ("plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own 
title which must be established by satisfactory, affirmative proofs; he can not recover on the 
weakness of his adversary's title"); Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, 106 Idaho 280,678 P.2d 72 
In their response brief, the Reads contend that Harvey has the relative burdens of 
proof in this case "backward," because the Reads' burden of proof "was effectively met when 
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they established that the Andersens intended the boundary to be the centerline of the creek in 
which water was flowing." Respondents' Brief, p. 20. Respondents then go on to assert the 
seemingly contradictory position that, once they demonstrated "where the creek was flowing at 
the time the controversy was forced into court," the burden then shifted to Harvey to show "that 
the location of the creek was different . . . in 1972." Respondents' Brief, p. 20. Not only do 
Respondents fail to offer any legal authority in support of their position that the location of the 
creek in 1972 was Harvey's burden to prove, but as the following facts of record show, the 
Reads' 20-year occupation of and changes to the disputed property makes the application of any 
such burden-shifting theory, even if legally supportable, equitably untenable under the facts of 
this case. 
The Reads bought their first two parcels in 1981 and 1987, respectively. At the 
time of those purchases, both parcels were covered with vegetation. Tr., p. 321, LL. 5-24. 
Hawthorne and alder grew in the "bottomlands" and "every kind of tree that grows" grew in the 
higher land to the north. Id Mr. Read testified that an aerial photograph dated 1983 accurately 
reflects the "heavy quantity of canopy froin vegetation" that existed on the Read property as of 
that date. Tr., p. 328, L. 3 top. 329, L. 22; Pls.' Ex. 16. 
Mr. Read testified that, beginning from the time they purchased their first parcel 
in 1981, he "logged, sometimes one tree at a time and sometimes literally logged the high ground 
and trees. I pulled stumps, mowed all the brush on the high ground, almost all of it, and we 
brushed out the bottom land." Tr., p. 322, LL. 7-1 1. This included pulling out small, three to 
four foot sized snowberry brush, as well as to twenty-five foot tall alder trees. Tr., p. 322, 
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LL. 12-24. This work was done with various heavy equipment, including a caterpillar, a 
bulldozer, a skidder, a backhoe, chainsaws, trucks, tractor, front loader, rock rake, back blade 
and brush hog. Tr., p. 323, L. 10 top. 327, L. 25. 
The Reads testified that the Department of Fish and Game "blew up" the dams on 
both the Lower and Upper Beaver Ponds in 1984 or 1985. Tr., p. 298, LL. 4-12. Shortly 
thereafter, in 1987, the Reads applied for a water permit to dredge out a diversion ditch and 
several stock ponds which are currently located in the area of Channel E. Pls.' Ex. 20. The 
Reads began the dredging and other excavation work on the diversion ditch in 1991. Tr., p. 304, 
LL. 8-12. This work included digging out (1) two shallow ponds upstream of the collapsed dam, 
(2) a connecting channel from the ponds to the diversion ditch, (3) a cove in the hillside to set a 
well casing and submersible pump, (4) "a diversion channel with little pools on it that'II hold 
water, and then. . . a bigger pond right about the south end of my high ground. . . into the hill." 
Tr., p. 299, L. 22 to p. 302, L. 6. Just beyond the big pond at the south end, the Reads "dug 
down and built the side up and built it up considerably so we could have a little waterfall." 
Tr., p. 301, L. 25 to p. 302, L. 2. The Reads also re-cored the old beaver dam and dredged 
material out of Channel D with a backhoe in order to obtain the material they needed to make a 
back lay for the new dam. Tr., p. 308, L. 8 to p. 309, L. 12.' 
Harvey's former real estate agent, John Gillham, testified at trial that during the 1980's, 
water from the Little Gold Creek flowed south in two locations, down Channel D, but also down 
Channel E (which traces the contours of the bottom of the hill where the Reads' residence is 
located). Tr., p. 446, L. 4 to p. 447, L. 1. Based on this testimony and additional investigations 
conducted by various expert witnesses, Harvey asserted in her defense and counterclaim that the 
historical boundary of the properties could have been in the location of Channel E. However, the 
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With regard to the excavation and other landscaping activities undertaken by the 
Reads within the meadow area between Channels D, E and A, the Reads testified that at various 
times they "cleared the bottom land for their horses;" Tr., p. 256, LL. 17-20; pulled out "a 
gazillion" beaver dams; Tr., p. 260, L. 20 to p. 261, L. 12; planted cottonwood trees along the 
junction of Channel C and Channel A, Tr., p. 253, LL. 19-23; tore out the alder trees that grew 
along the length of Channel B; Tr., p. 265, LL. 5-13; used an excavator in 1997 to "rip out" the 
thornapple trees that grew to the east of Channel B; Tr., p. 283, L. 13 to p. 284, L. 1; and 
"reworked" the field inside the disputed area to "put it in clover" by chemical burning the grass, 
rototilling the dirt and reseeding it; Tr., p. 282, L. l l to p. 283, L. 9. 
In March 1997, the Reads purchased from Jon Mason the parcel of property 
identified on the 1972 VanOoyen marketing diagram as Parcel 3 (also herein referred to as the 
"Mason parcel"). Def.'s Ex. E. Around August 1997, the Reads commissioned a survey of the 
southern boundary of the Mason parcel where it adjoined the property owned by Harvey. Pls.' 
Ex. 10; Def.'s Ex. JJ. In conducting this survey, the surveyors did not undertake to locate the 
"centerline of the creek" called out by the deed, but rather, merely 'y i ld  staked" a boundary 
line adjmtmnt that had previously been mutually agreed upon by Mr. Read and Mr. Mason. 
Tr., p. 388, LL. 12-18 (surveyor, Gilbert Bailey); Def.'s Ex. JJ. That boundary line adjustment 
was staked in the location of what is now referred to as Channel A. Id A Record of Survey was 
extensive excavation, stock-ponding and other alterations made by the Reads in this location had 
effectively obliterated any reliable evidence of an historical stream channel in that area. 
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recorded on September 5,1997, depicting Channel A as the "surveyed boundary" between the 
I-Iarvey and Read properties. Def.'s Ex. JJ; Pls.' Ex. 10. 
Shortly thereafter, in November 1997, the Reads had Channel C dredged out with 
a backhoe so that they "might be able to reestablish the fish moving up and down. . . to be able 
to get enough of a depth and width for fish to go back there, put a litlle rock in it." Tr., p. 287, 
L. 12 to p. 289, L. 9. Robert Read testified that the dredging in Channel C in November 1997 
"did not increase the amount of water flow" in Channel C, although the channel could now hold 
more flow "by being deeper." Tr., p. 289, LL. 13-20. 
The before-and-after photographs taken by Harvey in 1997 show that the 
excavation work perfonned by the Reads in Channel C in November 1997 was so extensive that 
it caused a significant build-up of sediment at the junction of Channel C and Channel A. These 
sediment deposits clogged off the flow of water in Channel A and caused the water to begin to 
flow backwards. Harvey was forced to dredge the sediment out of Channel A in order to keep 
the channel operative. Tr., p. 737, L. 6 to p. 748, L. 24; Def.'s Exs. TT, UU, WW, BBB, and 
TTT (Appendix B to Appellant's Reply Brief). Prior to the excavation, Channel C did not flow 
year round and was narrow enough for Harvey to step across it; after the excavation, it was no 
longer possible for Harvey to cross the ditch by foot. Tr., p. 737, L. 16 to p. 739, L. 3.3 
Later, in 2003, the Reads installed a culvert in the diversion ditch they had installed 
south of their excavated stock pond (in the area along Channel E) so that they could drive their 
tractor and other vehicles into the disputed "triangular area." Tr., p. 760, L. 22 to p. 762, L. 5. 
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In response to Harvey's objection over the Reads' recent excavation activities in 
Channel C, and the recordation of the September 5, 1997 Record of Survey containing the 
description of the boundary line as decided upon by Read and Mason, Tucker Engineering 
conducted a topographical survey of the meadow designed to more accurately locate the 
historical "centerline of the creek" called out in the deeds. Pls.' Ex. 11. In this survey, three 
channels were identified as existing "drainage channels" located inside the meadow. Pls.' 
Ex. I I. Mr. Read instructed the surveyor to label the channels identified by this topographical 
survey Channel A, Channel B, and Channel C. Tr., p. 280, L. 19 to p. 281, L. 3. 
After having conducted extensive excavation activities in the area of Channel E in 
1993 and in Channel C in 1997, and despite the inability of Tucker Engineering to definitively 
determine the historic location of the "centerline to the creek" described in their deed, the Reads 
filed their quiet title action in 1999 asserting that the boundary to their property lay in the 
location of Channels A and C, as depicted on the December 1997 topographical survey. See, 
e.g., Aug. R., p. 138; (Def.'~ Ex. JJ). 
There is no support under Idaho law, and even less support under the facts of this 
case, for the Reads' contention that after 20 years of extensive occupation, alteration, and 
excavation of the Little Gold Creek drainage basin by the Reads, they are entitled to a 
declaration of their property boundary in the current location of Channels C and A based upon 
nothing more than a showing of the fact that water was flowing in those channels at the time they 
initiated this lawsuit. The burden of proof at trial was upon the Reads, both as the plaintiffs in 
this quiet title action and as the parties who have exercised the greatest degree of control over the 
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Little Gold Creek drainage basin during most of the relevant time frame, to prove that water 
from Little Gold Creek actually ran in the location of what is now referred to as Channels C and 
A as of the time of the 1972 conveyance from the Andersens to Mr. Boss. 
2. The Reads Failed To Carry Their Burden Of Proof At Trial 
Both Mr. VanOoyen and Mr. Boss testified at trial that, in 1972, in addition to the 
presence of Little Gold Creek, there was also a "pretty tired ditch that didn't work very well 
. . . an ill-maintained ditch that drained the field above" that ran through the meadow that lay in 
the south end of the drainage basin. Tr., p. 646, L. 19 to p. 647, L. 4; p. 78, LL. 4-19; p. 82, 
LL. 4-1 1. The undisputed existence of this "tired ditch" is a critical fact in this case because, if 
the "tired ditch" testified to by both of these pivotal witnesses is in fact the same ditch currently 
referred to as Channel A in this litigation, it necessarily follows that Channel A was not the 
location of the centerline of Little Gold Creek in 1972. 
At trial, the Reads attempted to elicit testimony from Mr. VanOoyen that this 
"drainage ditch" was depicted on his 1972 marketing diagram by a dotted line located parallel to, 
but just south of, the location of the creek. Mr. VanOoyen was forced to recant this testimony on 
cross-examination upon the realization that the line that had been suggested to him as depicting 
the ditch was in fact one of a pair of dotted lines depicting the contours of the meadow, and that 
there was no indication anywhere on his marketing diagram of the existence of the drainage ditch 
that crossed the meadow somewhere south of the creek. Tr., p. 77, LL. 20-25; p. 87, L. 22 to 
p. 89, L. 1 I. 
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Nevertheless, in both in his Second Affidavit and again at trial, Mr. VanOoyen's 
testimony was clear that the "drainage ditch" in question flowed along a channel lying generally 
west and south of the creek channel. Id.; Aug. R., pp. 133-141. There can be no dispute on this 
record that Channel A lies to the west and south of Channel B, but there is no evidence of any 
ditch of any kind lying to the west and south of Channel A. The only reasonable inference to be 
drawn from these undisputed facts is that in 1972 the creek ran generally in the location of 
Channel B, and that Channel A was the "tired ditch" (drainage ditch) located to the west and 
south of the creek. 
Mr. Boss's trial testimony regarding the location of the drainage ditch in relation 
to Little Gold Creek was that, heading north from his cabin, he had to "cross over" the drainage 
ditch in order to get to the watering hole located next to the creek. Tr., p. 646, L. 19 to p. 647, L. 
4. Looking again at Exhibit QQQQQ (p. 4, supra), the only channel that exists between Mr. 
Boss' cabin and where he indicates the location of the creek to be in 1972 is Channel A. 
Because Channel A cannot simultaneously be both the "tired, ill-maintained ditch" and the Little 
Gold Creek channel containing "good water flow" year round (Tr., p. 78, LL. 4-19), it 
necessarily follows that Little Gold Creek flowed in a location other than Channel A in 1972. 
The Reads advance a theory at page 30 of their Response Brief that the "tired 
ditch" Mr. Boss testified to crossing on his way to the watering hole is not Channel A, but 
another drainage ditch that crosses the property to the northwest. This theory is rebutted by the 
testimony given by Mr. Boss in connection with Exhibit QQQQQ (p. 4, supra) because, as that 
map clearly shows, the only channel that lies directly north of Mr. Boss' cabin is Channel A. 
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Moreover, it is important for the Court to recognize that the ditch that Mr. Boss refers to as the 
ditch that "drained the fields from above" (Tr., p. 647, L. 1) and Channel A are in fact nothing 
more than opposite ends of the same channel. 
The drainage ditch that originates in the lands to the northwest travels generally 
southeasterly, crossing into the Boss/Harvey property where it morphs (purely as a matter of a 
change in terminology) into "Channel A" at the point at which it "T" intersects with Channel C. 
Thus, "Channel A" technically never existed until it was labeled as such in 1997 on the Tucker 
Engineering topographical survey. Because the "ditch" and "Channel A" were essentially one in 
the same as far as Mr. Boss was concerned in 1972, the Reads' argument amounts to little more 
than an issue of semantics. 
This fact is also key in relation to the Reads' claim to title based on their 
contention that "water has been flowing consistently in Channel A since the 1940's." 
Respondents' Brief, p. 28. The fact that the section of the drainage ditch only now identified as 
Channel A carried water in the 1940's does not prove that the water consisted of flows out of 
Little Gold Creek. Because Channel A has at all times since its creation been the southernmost 
outlet of a larger drainage channel from the northwest, merely proving that the channel "has at 
all times carried water" does not fulfill the Reads' burden of proof in this case. What the Reads 
were required to prove at trial was that at all times since 1972, the water flow in Channel A came 
from Little Gold Creek via Channel C. It is this fact that the Reads have failed to prove. 
The 1997 Tucker Engineering topographical survey clearly identified Channel B 
as an existing "drainage ditch" that connects to Channel D (the only historical portion of Little 
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Gold Creek whose location is undisputed). Moreover, Channel B is the only known water 
channel that lies to the north and east of the "tired, ill-maintained drainage ditch" described by 
Mr. VanOoyen and Mr. Boss (a/k/a the currently named Channel A). The fact that Channel B 
was relatively (but not entirely) dry in 1997 is easily explained by the appearance of Channel C 
at some point in the history of the creek after 1972: leaving no reasonable basis upon which to 
conclude otherwise than that Channel B is the proper legal boundary of the Read and Harvey 
properties. 
C. The District Court Erred In Ordering Harvey To Provide And Pay For A 
Survey Of Little Gold Creek As Part Of Its Judgment In Favor Of The 
Reads 
The Reads offer two justifications for the district court's order requiring Harvey 
to pay for an amended record of survey for the property that was awarded to the Reads. The first 
justification is that Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 1 1 (the 1997 Tucker Engineering topographical 
survey) had been prepared at Harvey's request, making it only equitable for the court to order 
Harvey to pay for the cost of correcting it. Respondents' Brief, p. 32. This argument is without 
merit because it is based on an inaccurate statement of the record. 
The Reads ordered a Record of Survey of the Mason parcel in August 1997: 
which was later used by them to file an amended legal description setting their southern property 
boundary in the location of Channel A (by mutual agreement with Jon Mason). See 
Section B. I., p. 12, supra. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, the topographical survey, was conducted on 
John Gillham testified that, as of 1977, the water from the creek that ran south out of 
the Beaver Ponds along Channel D did not flow into Channel A (i.e., that Channel C did not 
exist at that time). Tr., p. 429, L. 22 top. 430, L. 13. 
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behalf of both parties (Tr., p. 347, LL. 20-25) only after Harvey objected to the prior Record of 
Survey and the Reads' recordation of an amended legal description to their property placing the 
boundary in the location of Channel A. Id Thus, Harvey was not the party responsible for the 
recordation of the legally inadequate 1997 Record of Survey and should therefore not be the 
party responsible for the costs of its correction. 
The Reads' second justification of the court's order requiring Harvey to pay for 
their corrected survey is that an amended survey "would not have been necessary had she not 
started the controversy with her bogus claims." Respondents' Brief, p. 32. This argument is 
similarly without merit. This dispute originated when the Reads made claim to a portion of 
Harvey's meadow lying northeast of Channel A by their "agreement" with Jon Mason and the 
"field staked" Record of Survey on which they based their amended legal description of their 
property. To the extent that the survey and the resulting legal description are legally insufficient, 
it was an abuse of discretion for the district to order Harvey to pay to have it corrected. 
D. The District Court Erred In Awarding Reads Their Attorneys' Fees from 
October 3,2005, Through Trial Pursuant To Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(c) 
Harvey contends that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' 
fees to the Reads because the standard for an award of attorneys' fees under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37 has not been satisfied under the facts of this case. Harvey's legal arguments in 
support of this contention were thoroughly briefed by Harvey at pages 46 to 50 in her opening 
brief and need not be repeated here except to point out once again that Harvey was entitled to 
exercise her right to a trial of this matter following the order of remand from this Court, and that 
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the district court exceeded its discretion when it sanctioned Harvey for the exercise of that right 
by inviting the Reads to move for and later awarding the Reads their attorneys' fees. 
E. Respondents Are Not Entitled To An Award Of Attorneys' Fees On Appeal 
The Reads cite no legal authority in support of their request for attorneys' fees on 
appeal. Also, other than several paragraphs of the Reads' characteristic vituperation toward 
Harvey and her legal counsel, they cite no factual support for this request other than the naked 
allegation that Haxvey's appeal is "frivolous." 
In awarding reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party on 
appeal, this court will be guided by the following general 
principles. Since the statutory power is discretionary, attorney fees 
will not be awarded as a matter of right. Nor will attorney fees be 
awarded where the losing party brought the appeal in good faith 
and where a genuine issue of law was presented. In normal 
circumstances, attorney fees will only be awarded when this court 
is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued 
or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. 
Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 91 1,919-22,591 P.2d 1078, 1086-89 (1979). In 
this case, there is no basis upon which to conclude that Harvey's appeal has been brought 
unreasonably or without foundation or that the positions she advances on appeal are frivoIous as 
a matter of law. The Reads' request for attorneys' fees on appeal should therefore be denied. 
111. 
CONCLUSION 
In reaching its findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its judgment, 
the district court gave the appearance of being predisposed to reinstate its summary judgment in 
favor of the Reads, notwithstanding the contrary directives of this Court in its order of remand. 
Thus, for the second time on appeal, Harvey is entitled have the judgment of the district court 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 20 
vacated. Moreover, because there is no evidence that would support further findings material to 
the judgment, the record in this case also supports the remand of this matter to the district court 
with instructions to enter judgment establishing the boundary between the properties in the 
location of what is currently referred to as Channel B. Alternatively, Harvey requests a new 
trial. 
- 3 t  DATED this 4 ay of March, 2008. 
BY 
Scott L. Campbell - Of the Firm 4 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ROBERT C. READ and ALEXIS M. READ, 
PlaintiffslRespondents, 
VS. 
JENNIFER HARVEY, 
DefendantIAppellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 34336 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
Jennifer Harvey, DefendantIAppellant ("Harvey") hereby respectfully moves to 
strike those portions of Respondents' Brief which are disrespectful to the Court, which violate 
the standards set by the Rules of Professional Conduct, and can be of no assistance to this Court 
in reaching a correct determination of the legal questions involved in this appeal. 
A sampling of the invective and scurrilous statements made by Respondents 
throughout their responsive brief include the following: 
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Harvey mislead the Supreme Court into ruling in her favor on her first 
appeal when she knew that no factual issues actually existed to warrant a 
trial. Respondents' Brief, pp. 1-2, 3, 17, 32, 35. 
"This appeal . . . takes Harvey's abuse of the legal system and her 
deception of this Court to a new level, a level that unquestionably should 
be sanctioned." Respondents' Brief, p. 2. 
Harvey "twists," distorts and/or completely misrepresents the testimony of 
the trial witnesses. Respondents' Brief, pp. 4, 16, 19,20,25,29,34, 35. 
Harvey and her counsel are deceiving, misleading and making false 
statements to the Court. Respondents' Brief, pp. 4, 16, 17,22, 23, 25, 29, 
31, 34,35. 
Harvey and her counsel avoid disclosing material facts to the Court 
Respondents' Brief, pp. 18,33. 
Harvey is trying to "sneaK' evidence into the record on appeal 
Respondents' Brief, pp. 21. 
Harvey deceived and manipulated her witnesses at trial. Respondents' 
Brief, pp. 7,9-12, 13, 14,24,26,34. 
Harvey wrongfully manufactured her property dispute with the Reads. 
Respondents' Brief, pp. 2,3, 8, 32. 
"Harvey's arguments challenging the trial court's decision go far beyond 
the hounds of legitimate advocacy." Respondents' Brief, p. 16. 
Harvey's claims are the untrue product of "creative lawyering." 
Respondents' Brief, pp. 17,23. 
"Harvey's challenge . . . falls into the 'you have got to be kidding' 
category." Respondents' Brief, p. 23. 
"No explanation or excuse is possible for the complete absence of candor 
toward this tribunal shown by Harvey and her counsel." Respondents' 
Brief, p. 28. 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Respondents present, as an additional issue on appeal, 
whether this Court "should reinstate the trial court's initial ruling that Harvey's entire case, 
including her first appeal, was frivolous?" In other words, responding is asking this Court by 
way of response to Appellant's current post-trial appeal, to reconsider its prior appellate opinion 
in this case which vacated the entry of summary judgment in favor of Respondents. 
Appellant requests that all of Respondents' invective and abusive content be 
stricken from Respondents' Brief and that the Court disregard and give no consideration 
whatsoever to the personal attacks made by Respondents against Appellant and her legal counsel 
in connection with Appellant's first appeal to this Court or the currently pending appeal. 
Appellant further moves that Respondent not be permitted to submit, as an 
additional issue in this post-trial appeal, Respondents' request for reconsideration of the Court's 
prior appellate decision in this case, Read v. Hawey, 141 Idaho 497, 500, 112 P.3d 785,788 
(2005), which reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment and remanded this matter 
back to the district court for trial. 
DATED t h i s d a y  of March, 2008. 
MOFFATT, HOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys for Jennifer ~a rvey*  
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Charles R. Dean, Jr. (8) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Dean & Kolts ( ) Hand Delivered 
2020 Lakewood Drive, Suite 212 ( ) Overnight Mail 
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Fax: (208) 664-9844 
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Scott L. Campbell, ISB No. 225 1 
Kimberly D. Evans Ross, ISB No. 6900 
MOFFA'IT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JENNIFER HARVEY, 
DefendantlAppellant. 
ROBERT C. READ and ALEXIS M. READ, 
PlaintiffslRespondents, 
VS. 
Jennifer Harvey, DefendantiAppellant ("Harvey") submits the following 
memorandum of law in support of her motion to strike those portions of Respondents' Brief 
which are disrespectful to the Court, unwarranted under the Rules of Professional Conduct, and 
of no assistance to this Court in reaching a correct determination of the legal questions involved 
in this appeal. 
Supreme Court Case No. 34336 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE- 1 
LEGAL DISCUSSION 
A motion to strike is appropriate in those circumstances where the contents of an 
appellate brief are "couched in language disrespectful to the Court and officers of the court, and 
unbecoming an attorney and officer of the court, and that it is devoted largely and chiefly to 
personalities, vituperation, and abuse which is in no way connected with or supported by the 
record in t l~e case." Anderson v. Coolin, 27 Idaho 334, 149 P. 286 (1915); see also Idaho Rules 
of Professional Conduct, Rules 3.3 (candor towards the court) and 3.4 (respect and courtesy 
toward opposing parties and their counsel). 
In this case, Respondents' brief is replete with examples of Respondents' thinly 
veiled insults leveled at this Court as a result of its prior appellate decision in favor of Appellant, 
and a host of abusive and unwarranted personal attacks on Appellant and her legal counsel. 
These offensive comments are unworthy of consideration by this Court and should be stricken 
from the record. 
As the "Course of Proceedings" section set hrth in Appellant's opening brief 
makes clear, the trial court remained adamant before, during, and after the trial of this matter that 
this Court had wrongly reversed its prior entry of summary judgment by "buying into" Harvey's 
"baseless argument" that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the location of the 
boundaries betwccn the parties' properties. It is apparent from the general tenor of Respondents' 
Brief that the Respondents share the trial court's conviction that this Court's prior appellate 
ruling was in error. Nevertheless, whatever Respondents' opinion may be of the prior decision 
rendered by this Court, Respondents' vitriolic criticisms, "couched in language disrespectful to 
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the Court and officers of the court, and unbecoming an attorney and officer of the court," is 
wholly inappropriate as part of the content of briefing submitted to this Court in defense of 
Appellant's post-trial appeal. 
Similarly, Respondents' repeated use of disparaging comments "devoted largely 
and chiefly to personalities, vituperation, and abuse" as part of its defense to Appellant's legal 
challenges to the trial court's findings and conclusions at trial is unwarranted under the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and does nothing to assist this Court with its resolution of the issues in this 
case. For this reason, Appellant requests that all such content be stricken from Respondents' 
brief and that the Court disregard and give no consideration whatsoever to the personal attacks 
made by Respondents against Appellant and her legal counsel in connection with Appellants' 
first appeal to this Court or the currently pending post-trial appeal. 
DATED this22.&ay of March, 2008, 
Attorneys for Jennifer ~a rvey*  
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DEAN & KOLTS ( ) Hand Delivered 
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